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NINTH CIRCUIT RULES AGAINST 
SCIENTOLOGY MINISTERS’ FORCED-
LABOR CLAIMS IN HEADLEY v. 
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY 
INTERNATIONAL 
JEFFREY W. TYE* 
INTRODUCTION 
I. THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT OF 2000 
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), enacted in 2000, is 
an extension of a long line of judicial and statutory responses to the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against slavery.1  While the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s purpose was to outlaw slavery as it existed in 
pre-Civil War America, the Amendment’s blanket prohibition of 
“involuntary servitude”2 has led courts to adopt a much broader meaning 
of the term.3  Congress has followed suit by enacting various statutes 
             * J.D. Candidate, 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francsico, California; 
B.A. 2005, Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California.  
Many thanks to the Golden Gate University Law Review Editorial Board, especially Ninth Circuit 
Survey Executive Editor Kate Baldridge and Editor-in-Chief Alexandra Vesalga.  Special thanks to 
my wife Sonia for being a constant light of encouragement and positivity.   
 1 Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 101-113, 114 Stat. 
1464 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. tit. 22, ch. 78 (Westlaw 2012)). 
 2 The Thirteenth Amendment applies directly to private conduct; a rare constitutional 
amendment not limited to state action.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 3 See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing how the 
Thirteenth Amendment has been interpreted as a prohibition against any form of servitude, 
1
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throughout history aimed at banning different forms of involuntary 
servitude.4  Most recently, the TVPA was enacted to tackle an 
increasingly common form of involuntary servitude in the United States: 
the international trafficking of women and children for the purpose of 
prostitution.5 
Despite its focus on international sex trafficking, the TVPA forbids 
any type of involuntary servitude, whether by means of physical force or 
other, nonviolent forms of coercion.6  The primary effect of the TVPA’s 
broader definition of “involuntary servitude” has been to allow the 
government to successfully prosecute cases of psychologically coerced 
forced labor or servitude.7  But the statute’s broad conception of forced 
labor has also opened the door to the TVPA’s use as the basis of plaintiff 
claims in myriad civil actions.8 
There is still much ambiguity over the extent to which threats and 
coercion may be used as grounds for finding forced labor.  The question 
becomes especially complex when the statute is applied to defendants 
who are constitutionally protected from judicial scrutiny into such 
matters, namely, religious institutions. 
regardless of race); United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The 13th 
amendment and its enforcing statutes are designed to apply to a variety of circumstances and 
conditions. . . . [Y]esterday’s slave may be today’s migrant worker or domestic servant.”) (citations 
omitted), abrogated by United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988). 
 4 E.g., White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2421-2424 (Westlaw 2012)) (prohibiting the transportation of women across state 
lines for the purpose of prostitution). 
 5 Human Trafficking: Putting a Stop to Modern-Day Slavery, FBI (Apr. 16, 2010), 
www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/april/trafficking_041610. 
 6 Trafficking Victims Protection Act, § 102(b)(13).  The TVPA rejects a narrow 
interpretation of the term “involuntary servitude” by the Supreme Court.  In Kozminski, the Court 
refused to interpret the ban on “involuntary servitude” found in 18 U.S.C. § 1584 as applicable to 
labor obtained by means of psychological coercion.  Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949-50.  The Court 
noted that the government itself conceded in its argument that this interpretation would mean the 
statute “could be used to punish a parent who coerced an adult son or daughter into working in the 
family business by threatening withdrawal of affection.”  Id. at 949.  In the TVPA, Congress defined 
“involuntary servitude” to include cases where “persons are held in a condition of servitude through 
nonviolent coercion.”  Trafficking Victims Protection Act, § 102(b)(13). 
 7 See United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) (proprietors of unlicensed 
treatment center for the mentally ill coerced patients into forced labor and sexual acts); United States 
v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (man coerced woman into bondage relationship), 
vacated on other grounds, United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2010).  But see United 
States v. Peterson, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Ga. 2008) (court found sheriff’s use of inmate labor 
for private business was improper use but not coercion under the TVPA). 
 8 E.g., Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (suit against perpetrator by a victim 
of sex trafficking); Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011) (denying the defendant school board’s motion to dismiss TVPA claims by Filipino 
teachers who alleged the defendants forced them to work as teachers through nonviolent threats); 
Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (Nepalese workers alleged 
TVPA forced-labor claims after from being hired by the defendant to build American bases in Iraq). 
2
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II. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment provide religious institutions with a shield against 
governmental intrusion into their affairs.9  As a result, courts have carved 
out a legal defense for churches10 facing suits arising under certain 
employment statutes.11  In the Ninth Circuit, judicial inquiry into the 
employment relationship between a church and its ministers has been 
found to encroach on the church’s free-exercise rights.12  The scope of 
this ministerial exception has been limited,13 however, and its exact 
boundaries remain undefined. 
III. THE CLASH OF THE TVPA AND THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
In Headley v. Church of Scientology International, the Ninth Circuit 
faced a particularly sensitive question involving the limits of the TVPA 
and the application of the ministerial exception.14  In Headley, former 
ministers brought TVPA forced-labor claims against the Church of 
Scientology (the “Church”).15  The Church argued before the district 
court that the plaintiffs’ labor was not forced, and that the ministerial 
exception applied to effectively bar the plaintiffs’ claims.16  The district 
court agreed, holding that the instances of physical abuse alleged did not 
raise a triable issue of fact as to the Headleys’ forced-labor claims.17  The 
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
also contains a ministerial exception.  42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-1(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
 10 This Case Summary uses the terms “religious institution” and “church” interchangeably. 
 11 Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 12 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A 
church’s selection of its own clergy is one . . . core matter of ecclesiastical self-governance with 
which the state may not constitutionally interfere.”). 
 13 Id. (ministerial exception did not apply to allegations of sexual harassment because the 
defendant disavowed the alleged behavior). 
 14 Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l (Headley II), 687 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 15 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Church of 
Scientology International’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l 
(Headley I), 2010 WL 3157064 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010) (No. CV09-3986 DSF (MANx)), 2010 WL 
2915814 [hereinafter Marc Headley’s Brief]; Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, Headley I, 2010 WL 3157064, 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010) (No. CV09-3987), 2010 WL 3154356 [hereinafter Claire Headley’s Brief]. 
 16 Reply of Defendant Church of Scientology International in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment and for Summary Adjudication of Issues at 8-9, Headley I, 2010 WL 3157064. 
 17 Headley I, 2010 WL 3157064, at *5. 
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court also waded into constitutional waters, finding that the ministerial 
exception formed a second bar to the plaintiffs’ forced-labor claims.18 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s position 
that courts may not scrutinize certain aspects of the minister-church 
relationship.19  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit avoided the question of 
whether the First Amendment’s ministerial exception—usually invoked 
only in employment-law contexts—also applies to forced-labor claims 
under the TVPA.20  Instead, the court simply looked to the text of the 
TVPA to find that the plaintiffs’ labor was not, within the meaning of the 
statute, forced “‘by means of’ serious harm, threats, or any other 
improper methods.”21  In affirming the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, the Ninth Circuit found that the Headleys had voluntarily 
joined and worked for the Church because they believed in the Church’s 
doctrine and in the personal commitments they made to the Church.22  
Pointing to the Headleys’ ability to leave the Church, and their failure to 
do so for well over a decade, the court found that the plaintiffs simply 
were not forced to remain in their respective conditions.23 
IV. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTUAL HISTORY 
Marc and Claire Headley were long-time members of the Church of 
Scientology24 and its leading order, Sea Organization (Sea Org).25  Marc 
first became involved with Scientology around the age of ten or eleven, 
and at fifteen signed a symbolic billion-year contract with Sea Org.26  
Claire was raised in the Church, having joined at the age of four when 
her mother joined Sea Org.27  She had also signed a billion-year contract 
 18 Id. at *3. 
 19 Headley II, 687 F.3d at 1181. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 1179 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1), (2), (4)). 
 22 Id. at 1180-81. 
 23 Id. at 1179-80. 
 24 Based on the case’s dismissal at summary judgment and the applicable legal standard that 
“no genuine issue of material fact exists,” the facts in this Summary are taken largely from plaintiffs’ 
pleadings.  Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 
 25 According to the Church’s official website, Sea Org “is a religious order for the 
Scientology religion and is composed of the singularly most dedicated Scientologists—individuals 
who have committed their lives to the volunteer service of their religion.”  What Is Sea 
Organization?, SCIENTOLOGY.ORG, www.scientology.org/faq/church-management/what-is-the-sea-
organization.html (last visited Sep. 30, 2012). 
 26 Marc Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 2. 
 27 Claire Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 2. 
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with Sea Org by the age of sixteen.28  In 1992, Marc and Claire—both 
already members of Sea Org—married.29 
During their tenure with the Church, the Headleys primarily lived 
and worked at Gold Base, the Church’s international headquarters 
located in Hot Springs, California.30  The Church paid their living 
expenses and gave them each a fifty-dollar weekly stipend.31  The 
Headleys each worked more than one hundred hours per week for the 
Church in different capacities, although each had a primary position: 
Marc created and produced religious training videos explaining 
Scientology to the outside public, and Claire oversaw the Religious 
Technology Center’s (RTC)32 internal operations.33 
Sea Org set forth stringent lifestyle requirements for its members.34  
Members were required to live communally, were required to work long 
hours without compensation, and were subject to strict discipline for any 
transgressions of their duties.35  Members’ mail, internet access, and 
phone calls were monitored and censored.36  Members were also 
prohibited from having children—those who decided to have children 
were forced to transfer out of Sea Org to work for the general Church.37 
Additionally, RTC staff members were prohibited from marrying anyone 
other than fellow RTC staff members.38 
Throughout their membership in Sea Org, spanning well over a 
decade, the Headleys were subjected to various disciplinary methods.39  
These punishments often consisted of yard or kitchen work.40  Some of 
the methods, however, were extreme and degrading.  For instance, Marc 
and hundreds of other members were once assigned to hand-clean human 
excrement from a large aeration pond.41  Without being given a mask or 
gloves to complete the job, Marc recalled getting excrement in his nose, 
 28 Id. 
 29 Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l (Headley II), 687 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 30 Id. at 1176. 
 31 Id. 
 32 According to the Church’s website, “Religious Technology Center holds the ultimate 
ecclesiastical authority regarding the standard and pure application of L. Ron Hubbard’s religious 
technologies.”  What Is Religious Technology Center?, SCIENTOLOGY.ORG, www.scientology.org/ 
faq/church-management/religious-technology-center.html (last visited Sep. 30, 2012). 
 33 Headley II, 687 F.3d at 1176. 
 34 Id. at 1174. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 1175. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 1176. 
 41 Id. 
5
Tye: Headley v. Church of Scientology International
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
labor
 occasions when Miscavige had 
assau
 
mouth, ears and eyes, and dry-heaving for the first few hours of the job.42  
Security guards had been stationed at the pond to prevent any members 
from leaving, and when Marc objected, he was told, “you’re not leaving, 
period.”43  Marc testified to other harsh punishments, including being 
forced to live in tents and sleep on trash bags for months at a time, being 
assigned to clean the kitchen facility at Gold Base for several days with 
only a toothbrush, and being assigned to hard labor such as “digging dirt, 
weeding, throwing out trash, moving rocks, scrubbing toilets, and 
cleaning the isolation facility where sick people were housed.”44 
Claire also recalled instances of degrading treatment and verbal 
abuse.  On one occasion, the leader of the Church, David Miscavige, told 
Claire that he had her husband returned from a trip to Florida “in a body 
bag.”45  In another instance, Miscavige grabbed her by the pants during a 
meeting and forced her to drag him across the room to demonstrate that 
he was the members’ ball and chain.46  In addition, Claire was denied 
food privileges for lengthy periods and was frequently required to sleep 
at her workstation, resulting in significant weight loss and sleep 
deprivation.47  Like Marc, she was also assigned to heavy manual 
.48 
There were also incidents of physical abuse.  Marc Headley testified 
to two occasions when Miscavige struck him; once a “kick[] in his 
backside” and the other several punches to the face.49  In another 
incident, a high-ranking member punched him after he gave an incorrect 
answer to an interrogator.50  Claire Headley testified to being shoved by 
a coworker and to witnessing Sea Org staff physically abuse other 
members.51  She recalled at least fifty
lted coworkers in her presence.52 
The Church exercised control over most aspects of the Headleys’ 
lives.  Claire twice became pregnant during her membership, and she 
claimed that in both instances the Church coerced her into having an 
abortion by threatening heavy manual labor and interrogation if she 
 42 Marc Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 5. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 6. 
 45 Claire Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 5. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Marc Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 3. 
dley II), 687 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l (Hea
 52 Marc Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 3. 
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attempts to persuade them otherwise, the Headleys left Gold Base.63 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
refused.53  Claire was told on more than one occasion that in order to 
remain an employee of RTC, she would have to divorce Marc.54  All of 
the Headleys’ communications were monitored, they were strictly 
prohibited from leaving Gold Base, and their families were not allowed 
to know the location of the Gold Base.55  The base was surrounded by a 
perimeter fence equipped with motion detectors, floodlights, and 
spikes.56  Security guards were present throughout the base and were 
instructed to locate members who did not show up to their assignments.57  
The Church conducted extensive searches called “blow drills” for any 
member who left Gold Base without permission.58  During blow drills, 
teams of several members would track down the offending member and 
attempt to persuade him or her to return.59  The Headleys testified to 
witnessing other members being captured and returned, somet
gh physical force, and assigned manual labor as punishment.60 
Despite the foregoing, Claire and Marc Headley remained Sea Org 
members for fourteen and fifteen years, respectively.61  Both claimed 
that the physical and psychological abuse they endured led them to 
believe that if they attempted to leave Sea Org, they would suffer serious 
harm or physical restraint.62  Nonetheless, in 2005, despite 
In January 2009, Claire Headley filed suit against the Church and 
RTC in state court, asserting unpaid wage claims and seeking injunctive 
relief for the allegedly forced abortions.64  Marc Headley filed a separate 
suit alleging similar unpaid wage claims.65  Months later, the Headleys 
both amended their complaints to add forced-labor claims under the 
federal TVPA, and the Church subsequently removed both actions to 
federal court.66  The federal district court granted the Church’s motion 
 53 Claire Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 5. 
 54 Id. at 6. 
 55 Id. at 6-7. 
 56 Id. at 8. 
 57 Id. at 9. 
 58 Id. at 10. 
 59 Id. at 11. 
 60 Id. at 12. 
 61 Marc Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 2; Claire Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 2. 
 62 Marc Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 2; Claire Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 2. 
 63 Marc Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 14; Claire Headley’s Brief, supra note 15, at 16. 
 64 Brief for Appellees at 3-4, Headley II (Nos. 10–56266, 10–56278). 
 65 Id. at 4. 
 66 Id. 
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summ
ly dismissed.   
The Headleys appealed the district court’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit.75 
V.   THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS 
e 
Headleys’ claims under the TVPA.  The statute reads, in relevant part: 
 
for summary judgment as to Claire’s unpaid wage claims, and Marc later 
dropped his own unpaid wage claims.67  The Church then moved for
ary judgment on the Headleys’ remaining TVPA claims.68 
The district court granted the Church’s motion for summary 
judgment, holding that the ministerial exception barred the Headleys’ 
TVPA claims.69  During the course of litigation, the district court 
determined as a matter of law that the Headleys were ministers of the 
Church, and that the Church was a religious institution.70  Significantly, 
the Church maintained that the acts the Headleys complained of were 
doctrinally motivated, and so argued that the legal doctrine of 
entanglement barred the court from inquiring into those practices.71  The 
court agreed.72  Because of the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ accepted 
roles—as ministers and religious institution, respectively—and because 
the Church objected to the judicial intrusion on its religious doctrine, the 
court found that inquiry into the Headleys’ allegations impermissibly 
entangled the court with church doctrine.73  Thus, the court found that 
the ministerial exception under the First Amendment barred the 
Headleys’ TVPA claims, and the case was consequent 74
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit directly attacked the sufficiency of th
 67 Id. at 5. 
 68 Id. at 4. 
 69 Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l (Headley I), No. CV09-3986 DSF (MANx), 2010 
WL 3157064, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010). 
 70 Id. at *5. 
 71 Entanglement arises when a court “evaluates religious doctrine or the ‘reasonableness’ of 
the religious practices followed by the church.” Id. at *4 (quoting Bollard v. Cal. Province of the 
Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999)).  In an entanglement issue, even the inquiry itself 
into a religious institution’s minister-church relationship can be a violation of the First Amendment. 
Headley I, 2010 WL 3157064, at *5 (quoting Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 
598 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2009)), vacated in part en banc, 627 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 72 In doing so, the court rejected the Headleys’ contention that the Church’s conduct was not 
doctrinally motivated, pointing out that even the court’s inquiry to that matter would involve 
impermissibly scrutinizing the Church’s affairs.  Headley I, 2010 WL 3157064 at *6. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Brief for Appellees, Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l (Headley II), 687 F.3d 1173 
(9th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10–56266, 10–56278). 
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of, the following 
reats of force, physical restraint, or threats of 
by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person 
ny scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the 
m such labor or 
services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or 
shall be punished as provided under subsection (d).  
The
circumstances, to compel a 
reasonable person of the same background and in the same 
 that harm.  
Church could not have forced the Headleys’ labor “by means of” those 
constraints, because the record showed that those constraints were 
 
(a)  Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a 
person by any one of, or by any combination 
means— 
(1) by means of force, th
physical restraint to that person or another person; 
(2) 
or another person; 
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; 
or 
(4) by means of a
person to believe that, if that person did not perfor
physical restraint; 
76
 term “serious harm” in section (a)(2) is further defined to mean: 
[A]ny harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including 
psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently 
serious, under all the surrounding 
circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services 
in order to avoid incurring 77
The statute provides for imprisonment of up to twenty years, a fine, or 
both, for any perpetrator.78 
In analyzing the Headleys’ TVPA claims, the court focused on the 
statute’s use of the phrase “by means of”—in other words, the actual 
methods by which the Church was alleged to have secured the Headleys’ 
labor.79  Here, the court simply could not find that the Church had used 
improper methods to force the Headleys’ labor—especially given so 
many examples of the Headleys’ voluntary participation in the Church.80  
The Headleys had not complained about their primary roles within Sea 
Org.81  Rather, the Headleys focused on the “discipline, lifestyle, and 
familial constraints” imposed by Sea Org.82  The court found that the 
 76 18 U.S.C.A. § 1589(a)(1)-(4) (Westlaw 2012). 
). 
w 2012). 
87 F.3d at 1180. 
t 1180. 
 77 18 U.S.C.A. § 1589(c)(2) (Westlaw 2012
 78 18 U.S.C.A. § 1589(d) (Westla
 79 Headley II, 6
 80 Id. at 1179. 
 81 Id. a
 82 Id. 
9
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 after she was 
infor
embers that had done so successfully, but failed to do so 
them
y theories as to why the Headleys 
staye
 
ultimately what caused the Headleys to leave Sea Org.83  Indeed, the 
court pointed out that Claire Headley left Sea Org only
med she could not keep her existing job with RTC.84 
Moreover, the court found that the only adverse consequence the 
Headleys faced for leaving the Church was being labeled “suppressive 
persons” and excommunication from the Church.85  Under Ninth Circuit 
precedent, a church has the right to discontinue association with someone 
who has abandoned it,86 and to warn a member that he or she will be 
shunned by the church if that member abandons it.87  As such, the court 
found that the Church’s warnings to the Headleys that they would be 
ostracized did not qualify as threats of serious harm for the purpose of a 
forced-labor claim.88  Lastly, the court considered it significant that the 
Headleys had countless chances to leave the Church and knew of 
hundreds of m
selves.89 
Notably, the district court judge struck as unreliable the declaration 
of an expert who claimed that the Headleys were psychologically 
coerced into believing they could not leave.90  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s striking of that declaration, noting that the 
expert had never actually spoken with the Headleys before giving his 
opinion.91  Accordingly, the court of appeals did not consider any 
psychological or other explanator
d with the Church as long as they did. 
The court thus found that the Headleys had no actionable claims 
under the TVPA.92  The court further commented on the district court’s 
ruling that the ministerial exception applied, and hinted that, based on the 
Church’s averments that the methods complained of were doctrinally 
motivated, the court may have been correct.93  But the Ninth Circuit only 
went as far as necessary to affirm the district court, leaving the 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. (citing Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th 
ir. 19
 




 87 Id. at 1180.
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. a
91 Id. 
 92 Id. a
 93 Id. 
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f whether the ministerial exception categorically 
bars claims under the TVPA unanswered in the Ninth Circuit.94 
 improper conduct does not apply to voluntary, adult, 
long
ritical constitutional ruling for religious 
instit
h, threatened only by the 
prosp
as ministers.  
Consequently, Headley may bar anyone who willfully volunteers his or 
church, and has any chance to leave that church, from 




The implications of Headley may lie more in what was unsaid than 
what was said.  What is most clear is that the TVPA’s ban on forced 
labor by means of
-time ministers of a church.  Such ministers may face a significant 
obstacle in pursuing forced-labor claims against religious institutions in 
the Ninth Circuit. 
Less clear, because the Ninth Circuit did not reach the question, is 
whether the district court’s application of the ministerial exception was 
appropriate.  If the Ninth Circuit had found the ministerial exception 
applicable, it would have been a c
utions in the United States.  However, the court’s silence on 
whether it applied to the Headleys’ claims leaves the scope of the 
ministerial exception undefined. 
Perhaps more significantly, Headley has cast doubt over the 
prospect of any church members successfully bringing TVPA claims 
against their church.  The court’s focus on the voluntariness of the 
plaintiffs’ commitment and ability to leave the Church ultimately 
deemphasized the roles the Headleys played as ministers within the 
Church.  Thus, under Headley, even a non-ministerial church member 
who was physically free to leave the churc
ect of abandonment, forced labor, and other doctrinally motivated 
methods of punishment, could be unsuccessful in pursuing a forced-labor 
claim against the church in the Ninth Circuit. 
Headley may serve to extinguish future TVPA forced-labor claims 
against religious institutions in the Ninth Circuit.  Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision could serve as a more severe constraint for plaintiffs 
attempting to sue religious organizations under the TVPA than the trial 
court’s application of the “ministerial exception.”  The Ninth Circuit 
found that the Church did not cause plaintiffs’ hardship, indicating that 
the court considered the Headleys’ voluntary commitment to the Church 
more relevant to their TVPA claim than their roles 
her time to a 
 94 Id. 
11
Tye: Headley v. Church of Scientology International
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
endment involved.  By focusing on the plaintiffs’ 
voluntary participation in their Church, Headley may serve to limit the 
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude by 
barring similar forced-labor suits by even ordinary, non-ministerial 




Underlying the issues in Headley were two competing constitutional 
doctrines: the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary 
servitude and the First Amendment’s right to the free exercise of 
religion.95  Although the TVPA has an intentionally broad prohibition 
against forced labor, the Ninth Circuit found the Headleys’ claims 
outside the statute’s ambit.96  If the holding had been based on the First 
Amendment’s ministerial exception, Headley would have established 
that ministers have, in essence, forfeited their rights to sue their church 
under a forced-labor theory under similar facts.  But Headley’s refusal to 
rule on the First Amendment issue may have an unintended effect on the 
other constitutional am
 95 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States . . . .”). 
 96 Headley II, 687 F.3d at 1179-80. 
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